TL;DR

  • Portugal and Hungary restricted access to Polymarket under national gambling laws, applying similar legal reasoning but acting at very different points in their respective election cycles.
  • The cases highlight how parts of Europe crack down to curb political prediction markets, with enforcement driven by licensing rules rather than allegations of market manipulation.

European regulators are moving toward stricter enforcement against political prediction markets. In January 2026, authorities in Portugal and Hungary restricted access to Polymarket, contributing to a broader regulatory crackdown on Polymarket in Europe that treats election-linked markets as unlicensed gambling rather than financial services.

While the legal reasoning was similar in both cases, the timing differed significantly. Hungary acted months ahead of its next national election. Portugal intervened after the first round of a presidential vote, with a runoff imminent.

Portugal’s intervention during an active election cycle

In Portugal, the gambling regulator Serviço de Regulação e Inspeção de Jogos (SRIJ) ordered internet service providers to block access to Polymarket following heightened attention to election-related wagering. The decision was issued after the first round of Portugal’s presidential election on January 18, 2026, with a second round scheduled for February 8, 2026.

Public reporting around the move repeatedly referenced unusual late-stage betting activity tied to the presidential contest. Some coverage raised concerns about suspicious or potentially insider-driven wagering as voting concluded. Even so, the formal legal basis for the action against Polymarket rested on Portugal’s licensing and gambling law. Portuguese authorities cited the absence of authorization and the statutory prohibition on political betting, rather than advancing specific findings of market abuse.

The enforcement response focused on access controls instead of penalties. By directing ISPs to restrict availability, regulators moved quickly to contain activity as the electoral process entered its final phase.

Hungary’s pre-emptive block ahead of elections

Hungary acted earlier, issuing its decision on January 16, 2026. The national authority blocked Polymarket domains and displayed warning notices to users attempting to access the platform.

Unlike Portugal, no Hungarian national election was underway at the time. Hungary’s next parliamentary election is scheduled for April 12, 2026, nearly three months after the block was implemented. The action, therefore, reflected a precautionary approach rather than a response to live election trading.

This shows Hungary’s forward-looking enforcement posture towards Polymarket. Authorities applied gambling law before election-related markets could gain domestic traction, reducing the risk of disruption closer to polling day.

Political markets as a regulatory trigger

In both countries, election-related contracts sat at the center of regulatory concern. Political outcomes draw heightened scrutiny because of their sensitivity and potential implications for public trust in electoral processes.

At least in Portugal, public reporting highlighted concerns about suspicious betting patterns near key electoral milestones. Nonetheless, regulators grounded their response in existing law, treating political betting on Polymarket’s platform as a prohibited activity under national gambling statutes. The presence of integrity concerns influenced urgency, but not the legal framework applied.

A shared approach, with different timing

Portugal and Hungary now join a growing list of European countries that have taken steps against prediction markets under gambling rules. In the European countries that have acted so far, regulators have classified these platforms as betting services rather than financial instruments.

Once that classification is made, enforcement options narrow. Licensing requirements apply. Political betting bans apply. Access restrictions follow. What differs across jurisdictions is the timing of intervention.

Portugal moved during an active election cycle. Hungary acted well in advance of its parliamentary vote, signaling a more preventive enforcement strategy.

Polymarket presents itself as a venue for aggregating information through market pricing. European gambling law applies a different test. If users stake value on uncertain outcomes, authorities treat the activity as gambling.

This helps explain the tightening of gambling regulations in countries that have intervened. Platform design does not override statutory definitions. Operators like Polymarket face limited options, including licensing, geo-fencing, or withdrawal from specific jurisdictions.

Access limits and operational consequences

For users, the immediate effect is reduced access. Domain blocking and warning notices limit availability. In the European countries that have acted, blocking Polymarket has become the practical result once regulators intervene.

For the platform, the impact is structural. Liquidity fragments across borders, and enforcement actions tend to precede extended regulatory dialogue. Europe’s crackdown on Polymarket is reshaping how election-focused prediction markets can operate across multiple jurisdictions.

Closing context

Portugal’s mid-cycle intervention and Hungary’s blocking of Polymarket pre-emptively illustrate two regulatory tempos applied to similar national gambling‑law frameworks. Both point in the same direction. European authorities that have acted so far are asserting gambling law decisively, whether elections are weeks away or months out. For political prediction markets, the margin for regulatory tolerance continues to narrow.

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